Gone in Six Characters: Short URLs Considered Harmful for Cloud Services by Georgiev, Martin & Shmatikov, Vitaly
Gone in Six Characters:
Short URLs Considered Harmful for Cloud Services
Martin Georgiev
independent ∗
Vitaly Shmatikov
Cornell Tech
Abstract
Modern cloud services are designed to encourage and
support collaboration. To help users share links to online
documents, maps, etc., several services, including cloud
storage providers such as Microsoft OneDrive1 and map-
ping services such as Google Maps, directly integrate
URL shorteners that convert long, unwieldy URLs into
short URLs, consisting of a domain such as 1drv.ms or
goo.gl and a short token.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the space of 5- and
6-character tokens included in short URLs is so small
that it can be scanned using brute-force search. There-
fore, all online resources that were intended to be shared
with a few trusted friends or collaborators are effectively
public and can be accessed by anyone. This leads to se-
rious security and privacy vulnerabilities.
In the case of cloud storage, we focus on Microsoft
OneDrive. We show how to use short-URL enumera-
tion to discover and read shared content stored in the
OneDrive cloud, including even files for which the user
did not generate a short URL. 7% of the OneDrive ac-
counts exposed in this fashion allow anyone to write into
them. Since cloud-stored files are automatically copied
into users’ personal computers and devices, this is a vec-
tor for large-scale, automated malware injection.
In the case of online maps, we show how short-URL
enumeration reveals the directions that users shared with
each other. For many individual users, this enables in-
ference of their residential addresses, true identities, and
extremely sensitive locations they visited that, if publicly
revealed, would violate medical and financial privacy.
1 Introduction
Modern cloud services are designed to facilitate col-
laboration and sharing of information. To help users
∗This research was done while the author was visiting Cornell Tech.
1OneDrive was known as SkyDrive prior to January 27, 2014.
share links to online resources, several popular services
directly integrate URL shortening services that convert
long, unwieldy URLs into short URLs that are easy
to send via email, instant messages, etc. For exam-
ple, Microsoft OneDrive cloud storage service uses the
1drv.ms domain2 for its short URLs, Google Maps uses
goo.gl, Bing Maps uses binged.it, etc. In this paper,
we investigate the security and privacy consequences of
this design decision.
First, we observe that the URLs created by many URL
shortening services are so short that the entire space of
possible URLs can be scanned or at least sampled on
a large scale. We then experimentally demonstrate that
such scanning is feasible. Users who generate short
URLs to their online documents and maps may believe
that this is safe because the URLs are “random-looking”
and not shared publicly. Our analysis and experiments
show that these two conditions cannot prevent an adver-
sary from automatically discovering the true URLs of the
cloud resources shared by users. Each resource shared
via a short URL is thus effectively public and can be ac-
cessed by anyone anywhere in the world.
Second, we analyze the consequences of sharing for
the users of cloud storage services, using Microsoft
OneDrive as our case study. Like many similar services,
OneDrive (1) provides Web interfaces and APIs for easy
online access to cloud-stored files, and (2) automatically
synchronizes files between users’ personal devices and
cloud storage. We demonstrate that the discovery of a
short URL for a single file in the user’s OneDrive ac-
count can expose all other files and folders owned by the
same user and shared under the same capability key or
without a capability key—even files and folders that can-
not be reached directly through short URLs.
Because of ethical concerns, we did not download and
analyze the content of personal files exposed in this man-
ner, but we argue that OneDrive accounts are vulnera-
2When OneDrive was SkyDrive, the domain for short URLs was
sdrv.ms
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ble to automated, large-scale privacy breaches by less
scrupulous adversaries who are not constrained by ethics
and law. Recent compromises of Apple’s cloud services3
demonstrated that users store very sensitive personal in-
formation in their cloud storage accounts, sometimes in-
tentionally and sometimes accidentally due to automatic
synchronization with their mobile phones.
More than 7% of OneDrive and Google Drive ac-
counts we discovered by scanning short URLs contain
world-writable folders. This means that an adversary
can automatically inject malicious content into these ac-
counts. Since the types of all shared files in an exposed
folder are visible, the malicious content can be format-
specific, for example, macro viruses for Word and Ex-
cel files, scripts for images, etc. Furthermore, the adver-
sary can simply add executable files to these folders. Be-
cause storage accounts are automatically synchronized
between the cloud and the user’s devices, this vulnerabil-
ity becomes a vector for automated, large-scale malware
injection into the local systems of cloud-storage users.
Third, we analyze the consequences of public sharing
for the users of online mapping services such as Google
Maps, MapQuest, Bing Maps, and Yahoo! Maps. Short-
URL enumeration reveals not only the locations that
users shared with each other, but also directions between
locations. In many cases, these directions start from or
terminate at single-family residential addresses and al-
low inference of users’ identities via cross-correlation
with public directories such as White Pages. In addi-
tion, residential-to-residential directions could reveal the
existence of personal relationships, including those in-
tended to remain discreet. Even worse, many of the des-
tinations mapped by users are highly sensitive, including
hospitals, clinics, and physicians associated with specific
diseases (e.g., mental illnesses and cancer) or procedures
(e.g., abortion); correctional and juvenile detention facil-
ities; places of worship; pawnbrokers, payday and car-
title loan stores, etc. Analytics APIs can also be invoked
on individual maps to reveal the exact time when the di-
rections were obtained and how often the map was re-
ferred to, thus providing further context.
In summary, our analysis shows that automatically
generated short URLs are a terrible idea for cloud ser-
vices. When a service generates a URL based on a 5-
or 6-character token for an online resource that one user
wants to share with another, this resource effectively be-
comes public and universally accessible. Combined with
other design decisions, such as Web APIs for access-
ing cloud-stored files and retrieving user- or resource-
specific metadata, as well as automatic synchronization
of files and folders between personal devices and cloud
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ICloud_
leaks_of_celebrity_photos
storage, universal public access to online resources leads
to significant security and privacy vulnerabilities.
2 Background
2.1 URL Shorteners
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) are the standard
method for addressing Web content. URLs often encode
session management and/or document structure informa-
tion and can grow to hundreds of characters in length.
The HTTP standard [35] does not specify an a priori
limit on the length of a URL, but implementations im-
pose various restrictions, limiting URLs to 2048 charac-
ters in practice [38].
Long URLs are difficult to distribute and remember.
When printed on paper media, they are difficult to read
and type into the browser. Even when shared via elec-
tronic means such as email and blog posts, long URLs
are not elegant because they are often broken into mul-
tiple lines. The problem is exacerbated when the URL
contains (URL-encoded) special characters, which may
be accidentally modified or filtered out by sanitization
code aiming to block cross-site scripting and injection
attacks. Another motivation for URL shortening comes
from services like Twitter that impose a 140-character
limit on the messages users post online and from mobile
SMS that are limited to 160 characters, making it impos-
sible to share long URLs.
URL shortening services (URL shorteners) map long
URLs to short ones. The first URL shorteners were
patented in 2000 [29]. Hundreds of URL shorteners have
emerged on the market since then [25]. Many services
offer additional features such as page-view counting, an-
alytics for tracking page visitors’ OS, browser, location,
and referrer page, URL-to-QR encoding, etc.
A URL shortener accepts a URL as input and gen-
erates a short URL. The service maintains an internal
database mapping each short URL to its corresponding
original URL so that any online access using a short URL
can be resolved appropriately (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Resolving short URLs.
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To generate short URLs, URL shorteners first define
the alphabet (most commonly, [a-z,A-Z,0-9]) and the
length of the output token. The token, sometimes re-
ferred to as the key, is the last part of the short URL,
differentiating individual links in the shortener’s internal
database. For example, if the alphabet is [a-z,A-Z,0-9]
and the token is 6 characters long, the shortener can gen-
erate 626 ≈ 5.7 ·1010 possible short URLs.
Short URLs can be generated sequentially, randomly,
using a combination of the two (as in the case of bit.
ly [31]), or by hashing the original URL. Sequential
generation reveals the service’s usage patterns and intro-
duces concurrency issues.
bit.ly is a popular URL shortener. According to the
counter on the front page of bitly.com, the company
claims to have shortened over 26 billion URLs at the time
of this writing. The tokens in bit.ly URLs are between
4 and 7 characters long, but currently the first character in
7-character tokens is almost always 1, thus the effective
space of 7-character bit.ly URLs is 626 as described
above. Therefore, the overall space of bit.ly URLs is
624+625+2 ·626 ≈ 1.2 ·1011.
Some cloud services integrate URL shortening into
their products to help users share links. For example,
Microsoft OneDrive uses 1drv.ms for this purpose. Re-
verse DNS lookup shows that 1drv.ms is a branded
short domain [10] operated by bit.ly. Therefore,
OneDrive short URLs are in effect bit.ly short URLs.
This fact has two implications: (1) bit.ly and 1drv.ms
share the same token space; (2) 1drv.ms URLs can be
resolved by the bit.ly resolver. Note that bit.ly
URLs cannot be resolved using the 1drv.ms resolver
unless they point to OneDrive documents.
Other branded domains operated by bit.ly include
binged.it for Bing Maps, yhoo.it for Yahoo! Maps,
and mapq.st for MapQuest. All of them currently use
7-character tokens with the first character set to 1.
Google Maps uses the goo.gl/maps domain and,
prior to the changes made in response to this paper (see
Section 9), 5-character tokens. Thus, the entire token
space of goo.gl/maps was 625 ≈ 9.2 ·108.
2.2 Cloud Storage Services
Cloud storage services are gaining popularity because
they enable users to access their files from anywhere and
automatically synchronize files and folders between the
user’s devices and his or her cloud storage.
2.2.1 OneDrive
OneDrive is an online cloud storage service operated by
Microsoft. The first 5 GB of storage are free; larger quo-
tas are available for a small monthly fee.
OneDrive currently allows Word, Excel, PowerPoint,
PDF, OneNote, and plain-text files to be viewed and
edited through the service’s Web interface. OneDrive
also supports online viewing of many image and video
file formats, such as JPEG, PNG, MPEG etc. Users may
share OneDrive files and folders with view-only, edit,
and public-access capabilities.
OneDrive provides client applications for Mac, PC,
Android, iOS, Windows Phone, and Xbox to facilitate
automatic file and folder synchronization between user’s
devices and his cloud storage account.
To facilitate application development and program-
matic access to OneDrive accounts, Microsoft distributes
two different, independent SDKs: Live SDK [2] and
OneDrive pickers and savers SDK [33]. Live SDK is
built using open standards like OAuth 2.0, REST, and
JSON. It supports full-fledged access to files, folders, al-
bums, photos, videos, audio files, tags, and comments.
The lightweight OneDrive pickers and savers SDK sup-
ports limited functionality such as opening and storing
OneDrive files and creating links to shared files.
2.2.2 Google Drive
Google Drive is Google’s cloud storage product. New
users get 15GB of storage for free; larger quotas, similar
to OneDrive, are available for a small fee.
Google Drive has built-in support for Docs, Sheets,
Slides, Forms, Drawings, and Maps. Users can thus
view and edit popular file types like DOC, DOCX, PPT,
PPTX, XLS, XLSX, etc. Users can also install appli-
cations from Google’s Web Store that extend Google
Drive’s functionality to specialized file formats such as
PhotoShop’s PSD and AutoCAD’s DWG.
Google Drive provides client applications for Mac,
PC, Android, and iOS which automatically synchronize
files and folders between the user’s devices and his or her
cloud storage account.
To facilitate programmatic access to files and folders
stored on Google Drive, Google provides Google Drive
SDKs [15] for Android, iOS, and the Web. Additionally,
Google Drive API v.2 is available [14].
2.3 Online Mapping Services
Online maps are among the most popular and essen-
tial cloud-based services. MapQuest offered Web-based
maps in 1996, followed by Yahoo! Maps in 2002, Google
Maps in 2005, and Bing Maps in 2010. In addition to
driving directions, modern online maps provide traffic
details, road conditions, satellite, bird’s-eye, and street
views, 3D imagery of notable locations, etc.
All online mapping services let users share locations,
as well as driving directions between two or more loca-
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tions. The corresponding URLs are very long, thus map-
ping services directly integrate URL shorteners into their
user interfaces, helping users share maps via text mes-
sages, social media, and email.
Mapping services provide APIs and SDKs to appli-
cation developers. Google Maps [21] distributes SDKs
for Android, iOS, and the Web. Bing Maps provides
an SDK for Windows Store apps [8] and AJAX and
REST APIs for Web and mobile [7]. There is also
an unofficial, community-supported Bing Maps Android
SDK [6]. MapQuest supports Web Services, JavaScript,
and Flash APIs [28]. Yahoo! discontinued their Yahoo!
Maps Web Services in 2011, but previously they had pro-
vided Flash, AJAX, and Map Image APIs [40].
3 Scanning Short URLs
Scanning rates. bit.ly provides an API [9] for
querying its database. Access to this API is currently
rate-limited to five concurrent connections from a sin-
gle client, with additional “per-month, per-hour, per-
minute, per-user, and per-IP rate limits for each API
method” [34]. The limits are not publicly disclosed.
When a limit is reached, the API method stops pro-
cessing further requests from the client and replies with
HTTP status code 403. In our experiments, a simple,
unoptimized client can query the bit.ly database at a
sustained rate of 2.6 queries/second over long periods of
time. Further optimizations may push the effective query
rate closer to the stated 5 queries/second rate limit and
sustain it over a long time. We also observed that much
higher rates, up to 227 queries/second, are possible for
brief periods before the client’s IP address is temporarily
blocked by bit.ly.
goo.gl/maps also provides an API [18] for querying
its database. The free usage quota is 1,000,000 queries
per day [19]. At the time of our experiments, there was
also an option to request a higher quota.
Sampling. To generate random tokens for the 6-
character and 7-character token space of bit.ly and the
5-character token space of goo.gl/maps, we first de-
fined the alphabet: [a-z,A-Z,0-9]. We then calculated the
maximum number that a token can represent when inter-
preted as a Java BigInteger [5] and generated a random
number within this space, interpreting it as a token. Ran-
dom tokens in our samples were generated without re-
placement. The process of token generation ran until the
desired number of unique random tokens was obtained
for each target service (e.g., bit.ly) and target token
space (e.g., 6-character token space.)
To sample the space of bit.ly URLs, we gener-
ated 100,000,000 random 6-character tokens and queried
bit.ly from 189 machines. Our sample constitutes
0.176% of the 6-character token space. We found
42,229,055 URL mappings. Since the query tokens
were chosen randomly, this implies that the space of 6-
character bit.ly URLs has approximately 42% density.
Because not all characters in bit.ly URLs appear to
be random [31], there exist areas of higher density that
would yield valid URLs at an even higher rate.
We also randomly sampled the 7-character token space
on bit.ly. At the time of our experiments, bit.ly set
the first character in all4 7-character tokens to 1. Thus,
in practice, the search space of 7-character tokens has
the same size as the space of 6-character tokens. Simi-
larly to the 6-character scan, we generated 100,000,000
random tokens by setting the first character to 1 and ap-
pending a randomly generated 6-character token. The
resulting sample constituted 0.176% of the 7-character
token space and produced 29,331,099 URL mappings.
Thus, the space of 7-character bit.ly URLs has ap-
proximately 29% density.
A careful reader will notice that if our density esti-
mates are correct, bit.ly must have shortened more
than 0.42 · 626 + 0.29 · 626 ≈ 40 billion URLs. Yet, the
counter on the front page of bitly.com says that they
shortened 26 billion URLs. We conjecture that this dis-
crepancy is due to some URLs (e.g., those under branded
domains) not being counted towards the reported total.
goo.gl/maps has a much smaller token space: 9.2 ·
108 vs. 1.2 · 1011. Prior to changes made by Google
in response to our report (see Section 9), we scanned
63,970,000 tokens ≈ 7% of the entire token space. Our
scan produced 23,965,718 URL mappings, implying that
the density on goo.gl/maps is 37.5%.
Exhaustive enumeration. At the current effective rate
of querying bit.ly, enumerating the entire bit.ly
database would take approximately 12.2 million com-
pute hours, roughly equivalent to 510,000 client-days.
Amazon EC2 Spot Instances [36] may be a cost-effective
resource for automated URL scanning. Spot Instances al-
low bidding on spare Amazon EC2 instances, but without
guaranteed timeslots. The lack of reserved timeslots mat-
ters little for scanning tasks. At the time we were con-
ducting our scanning experiments, Amazon EC2 Spot In-
stances cost $0.003 per hour [37], thus scanning the en-
tire bit.ly URL space would have cost approximately
$36,700. This price will drop in the future as comput-
ing resources are constantly becoming cheaper. More-
over, Amazon AWS offers a free tier [3] service to new
users with 750 free micro-instance hours of Linux plus
750 micro-instance hours of Windows per month for 12
months. Therefore, a stealthy attacker who is able to reg-
4With a few hard linked exceptions like http://bit.ly/
BUBVDAY
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ister hundreds of new AWS accounts can enumerate the
entire bit.ly database for free.
Prior to changes described in Section 9, enumerating
the entire goo.gl/maps database would have required
916 client-days. Google Cloud Platform offers a $300
credit [20] to be used over 60 days. Therefore, a stealthy
attacker capable of registering a few hundred Google ac-
counts could have enumerated the entire goo.gl/maps
database for free in a matter of hours.
4 Short URLs in Cloud Storage Services
Cloud storage services create a unique URL for each file
and folder stored in the user’s account. These URLs al-
low users to view and edit individual files via the Web
interface, change the metadata associated with files and
folders, and share files and folders with other users.
Sharing actual URLs is often inconvenient: email
agents may wrap long URLs, rendering them unclick-
able, text messages and Twitter have a limit on message
size, etc. URL shortening helps users share URLs over
email, text or instant messages, and social media.
4.1 Microsoft OneDrive
The experiments in this section used short-URL scanning
to discover publicly accessible OneDrive files and fold-
ers. Our scanner accessed only public URLs and did not
circumvent any access-control protections. Information
was collected solely for measurement purposes.
Our scanner considered only the metadata, such as
files and directory names. We did not analyze the con-
tents of OneDrive files found by scanning because they
may contain sensitive personal data. Note that these con-
tents remain exposed through public URLs and are thus
vulnerable to a less scrupulous adversary.
4.1.1 Discovering OneDrive Accounts
Of the 42,229,055 URLs we discovered from the 6-
character token space of bit.ly, 3,003 URLs (0.003%
of the sample space) reference files or folders under
the onedrive.live.com domain. Additionally, 16,521
URLs (0.016% of the sample space) reference files or
folders under the skydrive.live.com domain. If
this density holds over the entire space, the full scan
would produce 626 · 0.003% ≈ 1,700,000 (respectively,
626 · 0.016% ≈ 9,000,000) URLs pointing to OneDrive
(respectively, SkyDrive) documents. In our sample scan,
each client found, on average, 43 OneDrive/SkyDrive
URLs per day. At this rate, it would take approximately
245,000 client-days to enumerate all OneDrive/SkyDrive
URLs mapped to 6-character tokens. A botnet can easily
achieve this goal in a single day or even much faster if
the operator is willing to have bots’ IP addresses blocked
by bit.ly.
Of the 29,331,099 URLs we discovered from the 7-
character token space of bit.ly, 25,594 (0.025% of
the sample space) point to OneDrive files or folders,
and 21,487 (0.021% of the sample space) point to Sky-
Drive files or folders. Thus, the projected URL counts
of OneDrive/SkyDrive links in the 7-character token
space of bit.ly are 626 · 0.025% ≈ 14,200,000, and
626 ·0.021%≈ 11,900,000, respectively.
For each OneDrive/SkyDrive URL found by our sam-
ple scan, the scanner issued a GET request. If the landing
page did not redirect to a page outside the user’s account,
we considered the link “live.” The number of live links
is generally greater than the number of OneDrive/Sky-
Drive accounts because different links may lead to dif-
ferent files in the same account.
Of the 3,003 OneDrive URLs (respectively, 16,521
SkyDrive URLs) sampled from the 6-character token
space, 2,130 (respectively, 9,694) were live. Of the
25,594 OneDrive URLs (respectively, 21,487 SkyDrive
URLs) sampled from the 7-character token space, 22,069
(respectively, 13,472) were live.
All URLs in our sample lead to distinct OneDrive ac-
counts. Due to the small sample size, we cannot draw
any conclusions about the total number of OneDrive ac-
counts that would be discovered by a full scan.
4.1.2 Traversing OneDrive Accounts
OneDrive supports all URL formats shown in Table 1.
Each account is uniquely identified by the value of the
cid parameter. The id and resid parameters have the
“cid!sequence number” format. Thus, given id or resid,
it is trivial to recover cid, but given cid, there is no easy
way to construct a valid id or resid. However, these
sequence numbers can be brute-forced. Possible val-
ues for the app parameter are Word, Excel, PowerPoint,
OneNote, and WordPdf. We observed only the value of 3
for the v parameter. The ithint parameter denotes a folder
and encodes the type of content therein, such as JPEG
PNG, or PDF. The authkey parameter is a capability key
that grants access rights (view-only, edit, etc.)
It is not necessary to guess URL parameter values to
gain access to OneDrive files. Having obtained the URL
of a single document, one can exploit the predictable
structure of OneDrive URLs to traverse the account’s di-
rectory tree and enumerate other shared files and folders.
The account traversal methodology described in the rest
of this section worked reliably between October 2014
and February 2016. As of March 2016, direct access to
the account’s root URL (see below) no longer reveals the
URLs of files and folders shared under the same capabil-
ity in that account.
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File type prefix path cid id resid app v ithint authkey
Word
https://onedrive.live.com
/view∗ 3 7 3 3 7 7
optional
Excel /view or /edit 3 7 3 3 7 7
PowerPoint /view∗ 3 7 3 3 7 7
OneNote /view or /edit 3 7 3 3 7 7
PDF /view 3 7 3 3 7 7
Surveys /survey 7 7 3 7 7 7
Media files / 3 3 7 7 3 7
Downloads /download.aspx 3 7 3 7 7 7
Folders / + 3 3 7 7 7 3
Table 1: OneDrive URL formats.
∗ Word and PowerPoint files shared with “edit” capability can be edited online, despite the absence of “/edit” path.
+ Folders shared with “edit” allow anyone to write into them.
Suppose a scan found a short URL such as
http://1drv.ms/1xNOWV7 which resolves
to https://onedrive.live.com/?cid=
485bef1a805 39148&id=485BEF1A80539148!115&
ithint=folder,xlsx&authkey=!AOOp2TqTTSMT5
q4. Parse this URL and extract the cid and au-
thkey parameters, then construct the root URL for
the account by replacing XXX and YYY in https:
//onedrive.live.com/?cid=XXX&authkey=YYY
with the cid and authkey values.
Prior to March 2016, access to the root URL made it
easy to automatically discover URLs of shared files and
folders in the account. For example, to find URLs of
individual files, parse the HTML code of the page and
look for “a” elements with “href ” attributes containing
“&app=”, “&v=”, “/download.aspx?”, or “/survey?”.
Such links point to individual documents. Links that start
with https://onedrive.live.com/ and contain the
account’s cid may lead to other folders.
Starting from each of the 2,130 OneDrive URLs dis-
covered by our sample scan of the 6-character token
space of bit.ly and navigating through the directory
trees of the corresponding OneDrive accounts, we found
a total of 227,276 publicly accessible files. Similarly,
navigating from each of the 22,069 OneDrive URLs dis-
covered in the 7-character token space yielded a total of
1,105,146 publicly accessible files (see Table 2).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of files per account
in our sample of the 6-character token space. The av-
erage number of files per account is 106, the maximum
is 23,240, the minimum is 0 (i.e., an empty folder). The
distribution of files per account in the 7-character token
space is shown in Figure 3. The average is 50, the maxi-
mum is 30,779, the minimum is 0.
4.1.3 Exploiting Unlocked OneDrive Folders
Among the 2,130 live OneDrive accounts discovered in
our sample of the 6-character token space of bit.ly,
Figure 2: Distribution of files per OneDrive account
discovered by scanning the 6-character token space of bit.ly
Figure 3: Distribution of files per OneDrive account
discovered by scanning the 7-character token space of bit.ly
150 have at least one folder shared with edit function-
ality. To find such accounts, our scanner searched the
HTML code of the page for a “span” element with
“class” attribute equal to “navLinkText” and text attribute
equal to “Upload”. Of the 22,069 OneDrive accounts
found in our sample of the 7-character token space,
1,561 have at least one folder shared with edit functional-
ity. We estimate that approximately 7% of discoverable
OneDrive accounts have world-writable folders.
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File type # of files found in 6-char sample space # of files found in 7-char sample space
Word 2,116 21,077
Excel 921 6,050
PowerPoint 688 5,068
OneNote 51 6
PDF 10,080 41,465
Surveys 22 226
Media files 204,735 862,641
Downloads∗ 8,663 168,613
Table 2: Publicly accessible files on OneDrive discovered by sampling from the 6- and 7-character token space of bit.ly.
∗ “Downloads” refers to file types not natively supported for viewing or editing via the OneDrive Web interface.
We call these folders “unlocked” because anyone who
knows their URL—which, as we demonstrated, is eas-
ily discoverable—can use the edit feature to overwrite
existing files and/or add new files, potentially planting
malware into users’ OneDrive accounts. Microsoft ap-
pears to perform some rudimentary anti-virus scanning
on OneDrive accounts, but it is trivial to evade. For
example, this scanning fails to discover even the test
EICAR virus5 compressed in the .xz format.
Automatic synchronization between the OneDrive
cloud and users’ personal machines and devices, which
is normally a very convenient feature, turns this vulnera-
bility into a major security hole. For example, if the at-
tacker infects a user’s existing file (e.g., inserts a macro
virus into a Word or Excel file), all of the victim’s devices
linked to his or her OneDrive account will automatically
download the infected file. When the victim opens the
file, the malware will execute with the victim’s privileges
on the machine where the file was opened.
The attacker can also add new files to unlocked fold-
ers, for example, executable malware files with names
designed to trick the user into clicking on them when
these files automatically appear on the user’s personal
computer or device. This attack vector can also be lever-
aged to exploit any number of known bugs in parsers
and renderers of common file formats such as JPEG [23],
PDF [32], and DOCX [13].
4.2 Google Drive
Unlike OneDrive, Google Drive does not directly inte-
grate a URL shortener, thus users need to manually in-
voke a shortener if they want to generate a short URL.
Our sample scan of 6-character bit.ly tokens
yielded 44 links to Google Drive folders: 30 are view-
only, 3 are writable, 7 have already been taken down, and
5The EICAR Standard Anti-Virus Test file is a special ’dummy’ file
used to check and confirm the correct operation of security products.
4 are permission-protected. Our sample of 7-character
tokens yielded 414 links to Google Drive folders: 277 are
view-only, 40 are writable, 49 have been taken down, and
48 are permission-protected. As with OneDrive, anyone
who discovers the URL of a writable Google Drive folder
can upload arbitrary content into it, which will be auto-
matically synced with the user’s devices.
Unlike OneDrive, Google Drive allows access to doc-
uments that were removed from the folders but not per-
manently deleted from the trash.
5 Short URLs in Mapping Services
In this section, we first show that by scanning short
URLs, one can discover driving directions shared by
users of online mapping services. We then explain how
these directions compromise users’ privacy by revealing
sensitive locations they visited, their social ties, etc.
Our analysis focuses on Google Maps because the to-
ken space of goo.gl/maps URLs was so small prior to
the changes described in Section 9. We believe that sim-
ilar results can be obtained for any mapping service that
integrates URL shorteners, including MapQuest, Bing
Maps, and Yahoo! Maps.
Google Maps. Of the 23,965,718 URLs in our Google
Maps sample, 2,357,844 or about 9.8% are for directions;
the rest are for individual locations.
Our sample includes directions to and from many sen-
sitive locations: clinics for specific diseases (includ-
ing cancer and mental illnesses), addiction treatment
centers, abortion providers, correctional and juvenile-
detention facilities, payday and car-title lenders, gen-
tlemen’s clubs, etc. In particular, the sample contains
3,913 map directions that start at a hospital and end at
a residential address, and 12,668 directions that start at
a residential address and end at a hospital. Figure 6
shows an example. We could have constructed similar
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Figure 4: Locations associated with a single user in Austin, TX. Figure 5: Locations associated with D & D Autows Inc.
maps for any sensitive location. More importantly, any-
one could have constructed them simply by scanning all
goo.gl/maps URLs.
Figure 6: Residential addresses associated with Hospital
Doutor Manoel Constaˆncio.
The endpoints of driving directions shared via short
URLs often contain enough information to uniquely
identify the individuals who requested the directions. For
instance, when analyzing one such endpoint, we uncov-
ered the address, full name, and age of a young woman
who shared directions to a planned parenthood facility.
Conversely, by starting from a residential address and
mapping all addresses appearing as the endpoints of the
directions to and from the initial address, one can create
a map of who visited whom.
Fine-grained data associated with individual residen-
tial addresses can be used to infer interesting informa-
tion about the residents. For instance, we conjecture
that one of the most frequently occurring residential ad-
dresses in our sample (see Figure 4) is the residence of
a geocaching enthusiast. He or she shared directions to
hundreds of locations around Austin, TX, many of them
specified as GPS coordinates. We have been able to find
some of these coordinates in a geocaching database [16].
Similarly, we can take a business (e.g., D & D Autows
Inc.) and extract all map directions created to or from
its location—see Figure 5. If a person had their vehi-
cle towed to or from their house, then their identity can
be easily inferred by cross-correlating the addresses with
public directories such as White Pages.
Additionally, Google API for short URLs reveals the
exact time when the URL was created, as well as the
approximate time of recent URL visits [39]. This infor-
mation can be used to create fine-grained activity profiles
for users who share Google Maps directions.
MapQuest. MapQuest uses the branded mapq.st do-
main operated by bit.ly. Our 6-character sample con-
tains 151,334 short MapQuest URLs: 6,737 for direc-
tions and 144,597 for point locations. Our 7-character
sample contains 141,721 URLs: 66,929 for directions
and 74,792 for point locations. All new short MapQuest
URLs use 7-character bit.ly tokens.
Bing Maps. Bing Maps uses the branded binged.it
domain operated by bit.ly. Our 6-character sample
contains 28,271 Bing Maps URLs: 10,020 for directions
and 18,251 for point locations. Our 7-character sample
contains 34,363 URLs: 13,116 for directions and 21,247
for point locations. All new short Bing Maps URLs use
7-character bit.ly tokens.
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Yahoo! Maps. Yahoo! Maps uses the branded yhoo.it
domain operated by bit.ly. Our 6-character sample
contains 1,331 Yahoo! Maps URLs: 771 for directions
and 560 for point locations. Our 7-character sample con-
tains 8,400 URLs: 6,207 for directions and 2,193 for
point locations. All new short Yahoo! Maps URLs use
7-character bit.ly tokens.
6 Mitigation
We suggest five approaches to mitigate the vulnerabili-
ties identified in this paper: (1) make short URLs longer,
(2) inform users about the risks of URL shorteners, (3)
do not rely on universal URL shorteners, (4) employ
CAPTCHAs or other methods to separate human users
from automated scanners, and (5) design better APIs for
the cloud services that use short URLs.
First, URL shorteners should use longer URLs. There
is an obvious tension between maintaining the bene-
fits of short URLs and preventing scanning attacks. It
might be instructive to compare the size of token space
to the “bits of security” metric sometimes used in cryp-
tography. Most token alphabets consist of 62 charac-
ters, which is close to 26. Each character can thus be
thought of as providing roughly 6 bits of search space.
We estimate that tokens of 10 characters or more would
make it difficult to scan the entire token space. From
a usability perspective, 10-character tokens will slightly
increase the difficulty of hand-copying short URLs and
also make them less “friendly-looking.” From an attack
mitigation perspective, longer tokens would be highly ef-
fective. For example, at the current density of 42% in the
6-character token space of bit.ly, the attacker needs
about 2 queries to obtain a single valid URL. Should
the token size be increased to 10 characters, the attacker
would have to send 35 million queries to obtain a single
valid URL. Future decisions on the size of token space
should involve careful analysis of attackers’ capabilities.
Second, URL shorteners should warn users that creat-
ing a short URL may expose the content behind the URL
to third parties. For integrated applications, the warnings
can be more specific and tailored to the application (e.g.,
maps). This approach has limitations. A typical user may
not be able to properly assess whether using a shortener
is dangerous. Furthermore, the person who is asking for
a URL to be shortened could be different from the person
who is impacted by its disclosure. For example, a towing
company may not care about disclosing the residences it
serviced even if the individuals being serviced do.
Third, cloud services should consider using internal,
company-owned URL shorteners, as opposed to univer-
sal shorteners such as bit.ly. This change would en-
able companies to (1) significantly decrease the density
of the token space, (2) closely monitor automated scans
of the short-URL space, and (3) take appropriate actions
as soon as a scan is detected. Furthermore, it will in-
crease the burden on the attackers since they will need to
scan different token spaces for different services.
Fourth, URL shorteners must take a more aggressive
approach against scanning. Instead of fixed monthly/dai-
ly/hourly limits, they should identify large-scale scan-
ners and block their IP addresses. Alternatively, they
could ask users to solve CAPTCHAs every few hundred
requests to verify that the requester is human.
Fifth, cloud services that use URL shorteners need bet-
ter API design. Lengthening short URLs does not pre-
vent an attacker who discovers a short URL to a sin-
gle file from enumerating all files and folders shared
under the same capability key. In particular, Microsoft
OneDrive should change the format and structure of long
URLs so that, given the URL of one document, it is no
longer possible to discover the URLs of other documents
in the same account (Microsoft appears to have made
this change some time between February and March of
2016). A similar approach is already taken by Google
Drive when individual files are shared.
7 Related Work
Antoniades et al. [1] explored the popularity, temporal
activity, and performance impact of short URLs.
Neumann et al. [31] studied the security and privacy
implications of URL shorteners on Twitter, focusing on
the use of short URLs for spam and user tracking, as well
as leakage of private information via URL-encoded pa-
rameters and HTTP referer headers. As part of their anal-
ysis, they discovered and manually examined 71 docu-
ments hosted on Google Docs.
In contrast to Neumann et al., we demonstrate that it
is practically feasible to automatically discover a large
number of cloud-stored files by randomly scanning short
URLs. We show how automated traversal of OneDrive
accounts reveals even files and folders that do not have
short URLs associated with them. We also identify large-
scale malware injection as a serious security risk for
cloud storage accounts discovered via short-URL scan-
ning. Unlike Neumann et al., we did not analyze the
content of private documents we found due to ethical and
legal considerations and the logistical difficulties of re-
questing permission from the affected users.
Klien and Strohmaier [24] investigated the use of short
URLs for fraud, deceit, and spam. Based on the logs
of the URL shortener their group operated over several
months, they concluded that about 80% of the URLs they
shortened are spam-related. This analysis does not apply
to short URLs integrated into cloud services.
Maggi et al. [27] built a service for crowdsourced users
to preview the landing pages of short URLs resolved by
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622 URL shorteners and found that short URLs are of-
ten used to hide the true URLs of drive-by download and
phishing pages. They also explored the countermeasures
that can be deployed by URL shorteners. They did not
discover the problem of cloud storage accounts or map-
ping directions exposed by short URLs.
There is a rich literature on inferring information about
individuals from location data. Becker et al. [4] used
anonymized call detail records from a large US com-
munications service provider to identify large groups of
people who collectively share the same usage patterns.
Crandall et al. [12] inferred social ties between people
based on their co-occurrence in a geographic location.
Isaacman et al. [22] inferred important places in people’s
lives from location traces. Montjoye et al. [30] observed
that 95% of individuals can be uniquely identified given
only 4 points in a high-resolution dataset such as a cell
phone carrier’s service records. Golle and Partridge [17]
showed the feasibility of re-identifying anonymized lo-
cation traces; futility of anonymizing location traces was
also demonstrated in [26, 41].
Between 2013 and 2015, information about many
Uber rides, including customers’ exact addresses, was
accidentally made public after Google indexed “share
your ETA” links posted by Uber’s customers [11]. Uber
fixed the problem by expiring the links after 48 hours.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
observe that the sharing of maps between users can lead
to significant privacy violations because short URLs in-
tegrated into popular mapping services effectively make
all shared locations and directions public.
8 Conclusions
URL shortening, which looks like a relatively minor fea-
ture, turns out to have serious consequences for the secu-
rity and privacy of modern cloud services. In this paper,
we demonstrate that the token space of short URLs is
so small as to be efficiently enumerable and scannable.
Therefore, any short link to an online document or map
shared by a user of a cloud service is effectively public.
In the case of cloud-storage services such as Microsoft
OneDrive, this not only leads to leakage of sensitive doc-
uments, but also enables anyone to inject arbitrary mali-
cious content into unlocked accounts, which is then auto-
matically copied into all of the account owner’s devices.
In the case of mapping services, short URLs reveal ad-
dresses and—via easy cross-correlation with public di-
rectories—identities of users who shared directions to
medical facilities (including abortion, mental-health, and
addiction-treatment clinics), prisons and juvenile deten-
tion centers, places of worship, and other sensitive loca-
tions; enable inference of social ties between people; and
leak other sensitive private information.
Solving the problem identified in this paper will not be
easy since short URLs are an integral part of many cloud
services and previously shared information remains pub-
licly accessible (unless URL shorteners take the drastic
step of revoking all previously issued short URLs). We
present several recommendations which could mitigate
the damage caused by short URLs.
9 Disclosure
Microsoft. We notified Microsoft about the security and
privacy risks of short OneDrive URLs on May 28, 2015.
In particular, any user who shares a short OneDrive
URL with a collaborator may unintentionally expose the
shared files and folders to everyone. Furthermore, if the
shared documents and folders allow writing, anyone can
inject malicious content into them that will be automati-
cally downloaded to the user’s computers and devices.
After an email exchange involving several messages,
“Brian” from Microsoft’s Security Response Center
(MSRC) informed us on August 1, 2015, that the ability
to share documents via short URLs “appears by design,”
and thus “does not currently warrant an MSRC case.”
In March of 2016, Microsoft removed the “shorten
link” option from OneDrive, causing a number of user
complaints.6 We asked MSRC whether this change was
made in response to our previous report. MSRC in-
formed us that our analysis played no role in their de-
cision to remove this option and reiterated that they do
not consider our report a security vulnerability. At ap-
proximately the same time, Microsoft changed the API
so that the account traversal methodology described in
Section 4.1.2 no longer appears to work.
As of this writing, all previously generated short
OneDrive URLs remain vulnerable to scanning and mal-
ware injection.
Google. We notified Google about the privacy risks
of short Google Maps URLs on September 15, 2015.
Google promptly responded to our report. As of Septem-
ber 21, 2015, newly created short URLs to Google Maps
have 11 or 12-character tokens and are thus not vulnera-
ble to brute-force scanning.
6http://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/onedrive/forum/odwork-
odshare/shorten-link-option-no-longer-available-on/bc3dc4eb-cb54-
43e0-bcff-a072e8dba3ad?auth=1
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